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WITTGENSTEIN'S TRACTATUS: SOME 
METAPHILOSOPHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Howard P. Kainz 
 
In the case of many philosophers, a study of their earlier works could lead to a misconception of 
their doctrine. For example, if we concentrated on Kant's early work, OBSERVATIONS ON THE 
FEELING OF THE BEAUTIFUL AND SUBLIME, we would be led to think that Kant attributed 
aesthetic feeling to psychological makeup and to temperamental, sexual, and racial differences. 
If we concentrated on Hegel's early writings, we would think that the final, "absolute" synthesis 
of reality was to be found in religious consciousness. If we took Marx's 1844 Manuscripts too 
seriously, we would be led to believe that he looked forward to some ultimate 
goal "beyond" communism, which would manifest the real structure of 
human society. And we could make similar observations regarding the 
earlier Wittgenstein, the logical atomist, as compared with the later Witt- 
genstein of the "word games". 
In all such cases, however, the misconceptions that would result from such a 
study would be misconceptions specifically as to "what was the doctrine of 
Kant on aesthetics," "what was the doctrine of Hegel on the Absolute, " etc. 
In other words, they would be misconceptions resulting from a distorted 
view of the significance of some "early work" in the context of the 
development of a particular philosopher, or in the context of the 
development of the history of philosophy. 
But if we put aside questions of temporal and historical philosophical 
development, to examine these early works on their own merits-- this can 
be useful--especially if it is a relatively self-consistent, systematic 
presentation, and especially if it is set  in the  context of the question, 
"does this early work tell us anything about reality?" For, after all, the 
main purpose of philosophy is  not  to determine what philosophers have 
opined, but to try to say something about the way things are. And the 
world view in an early work can be just as useful for that purpose as a later 
one.  Not necessarily "truer."  But very likely it would be inappropriate to 
apply the terms "true" or "false" to a world view "qua" world view. For 
almost any world view seems to contain, at least implicitly, some general 
criteria for determining truth and falsity--criteria which could not be 
applied to itself without "begging the question." If we had a world view of 
world views, "then" we might be able to discuss them in terms of truth or 
falsity. But inlieu of any such hypothesis, we shall hypothe- size that, just 
as the mountain climber can get a view of the land- scape from the east  
or the west,  or  just  as  the artist can get a view of his model from the 
front  or the side--so also any philosopher at any time in his development 
can present what is "truly" a "view" but not necessarily more true or more 
false than other views--even the later views of the same philosopher. 
But is not a specific world view to be judged "false" when it gets into 
inevitable self-contradictions? For example, in Wittgenstein's case, the 
propositions of the TRACTATUS, "insofar as they do not represent the 
world itself by way  of elementary  propositions,  but are precisely 'about' 
the relationship between  language and reality, lie outside the scope of 
assertions that have sense and therefore are '·nonsensical. ‘”1  But then  again, 
Kant's  views  in his  first  CRITIQUE  about space and time and the categories--
if they add anything to our knowledge--might well be taken as instances of "a 
priori synthetic" judgments in metaphysics; but this would make  the  whole 
enterprise of the CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON (namely, determining whether a 
priori synthetic judgments are possible in metaphysics) rather superfluous.  
Similarly, the Thomistic view that truth is "conformity of the mind to 
objective reality" raises the question as to whether the mind that makes this 
statement is conformed to the objective reality of truth. 
Perhaps, then, it is inevitable that any elaborately structured philosophical 
system should come now and then to the limits of its "viability". And perhaps 
it is  these limits  that  supply  the  necessary and sufficient impetus to other 
world views, which can remedy the defects of the former (without, however, 
failing to avoid some "sui generis" defects  of  their  own).2 
But different world views are not necessarily different in all respects. And 
indeed, it is the recurrence of similar ideas in strikingly different philosophical 
contexts that is one of the most interesting "phenomena", from a 
metaphilosophical point of view.  Should not these convergences, as they turn 
up, merit our special and serious consideration, precisely "because" two or 
more very disparate philosophers have enunciated them? The answer to this 
question, of course, lies outside any particular philosophical system. 
Rather than trying to answer this question, this paper will simply take its 
departure from the world-view presented in Wittgenstein's TRACTATUS, 
and point out some possibilities of parallels in the world views of some 
other philosophers--namely, Plato, Aristotle, and Hegel. In this way it will 
be supplying some of the "facts" that one would have to consider before 
trying to answer the metaphilosophical question brought forward in the 
preceding paragraph. 
Wittgenstein, of course, situates philosophy exclusively in the realms of 
logic and language. However, if we treat these realms as just one "sphere 
of discourse" about philosophy, and make proper allowance for 
differences in perspective, these are some of the parallels or convergences 
that turn  up: 
Vis  a  vis  Plato.... 
Wittgenstein says that number, "qua" number, is outside the do- main of 
logic and logical forms (4. 128). For logic in itself is a do- main which is 
transcendent, i.e. , transcends all experience and all bodies of doctrine,  
including  mathematics (6.13). Logic is a completely a priori system (5. 
4541, 5. 552), which contains in itself no numbers. The propositions  of 
mathematics are an exemplification of logical method (b.2); but this 
relationship  is  not convertible.  That is, logical propositions do not  exemplify  
mathematics  or  number.  And in fact it would even be a misnomer to speak 
of any logico-philo- sophical realm as a "monism" or a "dualism"  (4.128). 
Although Plato does not describe the relationship of number to the Ideas 
in any extant dialogue, it is well-known that he considered mathematical 
ideas to constitute a kind of intermediate world of Ideas--separate from 
sensible reality, but inferior to Ideas of Forms in the strict sense. Thus, as 
Aristotle presents Plato's doctrine in METAPH. I, 6--the causative, separate 
Numbers are stable and eternal realities, which are just a single degree 
inferior to the Forms, insofar as they allow a multiplication of similarities, 
while the Forms are pure abstract unity, prior to all multiplicity. 
Thus, Plato seems to anticipate in a mythical or symbolic fashion the 
hierarchical relationship to be found between form-and-number in 
Wittgenstein's logico-philosophical reconstruction of reality (in which a priori 
propositions of logic take the place of a priori Platonic Forms). 
Vis a vis Aristotle.... 
One thing that is hard to understand in the TRACTATUS is how a 
proposition, which is an assertion of a fact, and a picture of that fact as an 
existent state of affairs--could itself be a fact (2.141).  
If a proposition depicts by means of its logical form, and if logical form 
itself constitutes the limits of our cognized world, it would not seem that 
this logical picture could itself be numbered among those facts, the sum-
total of which "constitutes" the world. It certainly is not outside the world. 
If in addition it is not  at the limits of the factual world, but within, it 
would then seem to be capable of being analyzed in terms of truth - 
possibilities, and in terms of constituent atomic objects, or termini of 
intrinsic possibilities of relationships. Thus in this case we could have a 
science of those forms depicting physical phenomena; i.e., a metaphysics. 
It seems to have been some such consideration which led Aristotle in his 
PHYSICS to the intimation that, having uncovered the intelligible form of 
objects, we might have a higher science about the intrinsic  properties  of  
form  itself. 3 And this led to the METAPHYSICS. 
Wittgenstein, it seems,   had  no such  intimations. Or  if he did have some 
such intimation, perhaps this is one major reason why he eventually 
abandoned the method of the TRACTATUS for the approach of the 
PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS. But, within the context of the TRACTATUS 
alone, it does seem strange that he should designate the propositions 
mirroring the world as "facts"--unless he considered them merely in terms 
of their sensuous signs or vocal enunciations. In the latter case, 
Wittgenstein's theory of depiction and logical form would seem to be 
something definitely on the side of the mystical. 
Vis a vis Hegel.  .  .  . 
If one remembers to make due allowances for  an extreme difference in 
contexts, he may also notice one striking parallel  to  be found in the  world-
view of Wittgenstein and the  world-view of  Hegel. 
Wittgenstein, in a kind of  rambling fashion,  proposes  for  himself in the 
course· of the TRACTATUS, the following problem:  How can we express the 
general form of all propositions--a proposition of propositions which would 
summarize in symbolic form all the types  and variations of propositions 
which are conceivable. He introduces this problem in 5.47-5. 472, and follows 
it up in various forms in 5. 5,5.502, and 6-6. 01. He concludes that the 
general form of propositions could be expressed as the operation of a series 
of negations effected upon elementary propositional variables. In other 
words, the general form of all (molecular) propositions could be expressed as 
the successive negation of the (atomic) propositions from which they are 
constructed. 
Hegel, in the LECTURES ON THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY, criticizes Spinoza for 
constructing an incomplete system,  in which God, the "causa sui," is the only 
positive reality  in the world. If only Spinoza had recognized that God became a 
positive reality through the "negation of negation" (negating Himself by 
production of the world)--then he could have elaborated a system which woul4 
have given due respect to human freedom  and  individuality, as  the  "negative" of 
the Absolute Being of God.4 Hegel, however, does not just criticize Spinoza, but 
attempts to present his own "Absolute" as the "negation of negation."  For  
example,  the  first  "Absolute"  which  Hegel  arrives at in his PHENOMENOLOGY 
is "die Sache Selbst"--a particular type of individual consciousness which has 
negated objectivity, and then negated this negation to produce a living, categorical 
synthesis of subjectivity and objectivity;5 and the second "Absolute"  which  he 
arrives at is Absolute Knowledge,6 a supreme philosophical  vantage point which 
has resulted from the individual's  negation  of  himself (through culture and 
history), and the negation of  this  negation,  resulting in a conscious reconciliation 
of the individual with his  total milieu.  Similarly,  in  Hegel's  ENCYCLOPEDIA,  the  
Absolute  Idea, the  Absolute   Concept,   and  Absolute  Spirit   are  likewise  
established as  "negations  of  negation."   Thus we  might  say  that--just  as 
Hegel's SACHE SELBST is the "fact of facts" produced by successive negations,  and  
just as his Absolute  Knowledge is  the  consciousness   of consciousness produced 
by successive negations -- so also Wittgenstein's formula  for  the  general  form  of  
propositions, [𝜏,𝛮?̅?]′(𝜂), is for all  practical purposes,   a proposition of  
propositions,   or an expression of expressions, an "absolute" which he arrives at in  
the domain of logic,  by the  process of successive negation. 
In conclusion, we might observe that the inference that one draws from the 
above-mentioned parallels will depend, in large-part, on one's value system. 
If, for example, one has ontological or metaphysical leanings, he might say that 
Wittgenstein, purportedly confining himself to the realms of pure logical 
analysis, inadvertently and covertly encounters problems, now and then, which 
bear on the ontological constitution  of reality. 
If, on the other hand, a) one is of an anti-metaphysical persuasion, but b) goes 
beyond mere allegations of "nonsense" to recognize some such parallelism--he 
might in congruence with his own value system, judge that Plato, in his doctrine 
of the World of Forms, was covertly  or symbolically or mythically referring to 
relationships among propositions about the world; that Aristotle, in asking 
whether every form had to be considered  in relationship  to matter, was asking,  
in terms of his own mythical projections, whether every fact was a 
"representation" of a state of affairs; and that Hegel, in producing his Absolute 
through the negation of negations, was showing in a symbolic or mythical way 
that the general logical form encompassing all statements about reality would 
have to  be a negation of  negations. 
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